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Scalar implicatures, the phenomena where a sentence like “The pianist played some
Mozart sonatas” is interpreted, as “The pianist did not play all Mozart sonatas” have
been given two different analyses. Neo-Griceans (NG) claim that this interpretation is
based on lexical scales (e.g., <some, all>), where the stronger term (e.g., all) implies
the weaker term (e.g., some), but the weaker term (e.g., some) implicates the negation
of the stronger term (i.e., some = not all). Post-Griceans (PG) deny that this is the
case and offer a context-based inferential account for scalar implicatures. While scalar
implicatures have been extensively investigated, with results apparently in favor of PG
accounts, the psychological reality of lexical scales has not been put to the test. This is
what we have done in the present experiment, with a lexical decision task using lexical
scales in a masked priming paradigm. While PG accounts do not attribute any role
for lexical scales in the computation of scalar implicatures, NG accounts suggest that
lexical scales are the core mechanism behind the computation of scalar implicatures,
and predict that weaker terms in a scale should prime stronger terms more than the
reverse because stronger words are necessary to the interpretation of weaker words,
while stronger words can be interpreted independently of weaker words. Our results
provided evidence in favor of the psychological existence of scales, leading to the first
clear experimental support for the NG account.
Keywords: lexical scales, masked priming, lexical decision task, scalar implicature, implication, experimental
pragmatics, psycholinguistics
INTRODUCTION
The notion of implicature was introduced by Grice (1975) to account for information that was
communicated without being, strictly speaking, said by the speaker, in other words, for information
that was implicitly rather than explicitly communicated (Grice, 1989). For instance, if the speaker
asked where Anne lives, an answer such as “Somewhere in Burgundy, I believe,” conversationally
implicates that he does not know exactly where she lives.
Grice distinguished among conversational implicatures those that (as in the previous example)
strongly depend on the context (the Particularized Conversational Implicatures: PCIs) from
those that depend on the words used (the Generalized Conversational Implicatures: GCIs). The
paramount examples of GCIs are so-called scalar implicatures. For instance, if the speaker says,
“The pianist played some Beethoven sonatas,” she implicates, through the use of some, that the
pianist did not play all of them. Note that both GCIs and PCIs are computed through the same
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mechanism: they are the result of an inference that was made
by comparing what the speaker says with what she might have
said but did not say. In other words, these inferences are based
on alternatives to what was said. A sentence such as “Anne lives
somewhere in Burgundy, I believe,” leads us to derive a PCI, i.e.,
the speaker does not know where exactly Anne lives, because we
quickly infer that if he knew it, he would have said where she lives
precisely. Through the same inferential mechanism a GCI such
as “The pianist played some Beethoven sonatas,” implicates that
he did not play all of them, because if he had played all of them
(on the assumption that the speaker knew it), the speaker would
have used all rather than some. However, despite the fact that they
share the same inferential mechanism, PCIs and GCIs differ in
the ways in which “the alternatives” are determined: through the
context for PCIs and though the lexicon for GCIs.
Neo-Gricean and Post-Gricean Accounts
The notion of implicature was quickly incorporated from
philosophy of language into pragmatics, but led to two highly
different approaches: The Neo-Gricean (NG) and the Post-
Gricean (PG) approaches. The NG approaches (see e.g., Horn,
1972, 2004; Levinson, 2000; Chierchia, 2004) claimed, on the
basis of scalar implicatures, that GCIs are derived locally and
automatically (by default) when the trigger belongs to a linguistic
scale. Such lexical scales are ordered sets of terms, such as
<and, or>, where the stronger member, and, implies the weaker
member, or, and the weaker member, or, implicates the negation
of the stronger member: p or q implicates not (p and q) (i.e., one
or the other but not both). The implicature interpretation can be
canceled in favor of a semantic interpretation (p or q and possibly
both), but this will only come after the pragmatic interpretation
has been accessed and at a cost.
The NG approach is a more or less straightforward extension
of Gricean theory, in the sense that it considers scalar
implicatures to be conversational implicatures, and that it is
a development of Grice’s intuition that some conversational
implicatures are entirely dependent on the context while others
are not (and scalar implicatures are a major example of the latter
kind). Scalar implicatures—and this is the new development
brought about by Horn (1972)—depends on the existence
of lexical scales. Horn proposed that, in the case of scalar
implicatures, the alternatives we compare to what the speaker
said are determined by the lexical scale to which the term that
triggers the inference belongs. In other words, when a weaker
term of a scale (e.g., “some”) is used in a sentence, a comparison
is made with the stronger term(s) in the scale (e.g., “all”) as
alternatives to what the speaker said (e.g., “If she used some,
it’s because it’s not all”). In a more recent development of this
position, Levinson (2000) went one-step further and proposed
that the pragmatic interpretation of the scalar term is lexicalized
as its default interpretation. In other terms, the pragmatic
interpretation of scalar items is encoded as a (defeasible) part
of its meaning (i.e., “some” also means “not all”), while the
semantic interpretation (i.e., “some = at least one”) would only
be accessible if the pragmatic interpretation is explicitly negated
(e.g., “The pianist played some Mozart sonatas and even all of
them”).
By contrast, PG accounts, such as Relevance Theory (see
e.g., Sperber and Wilson, 1986/1995; Carston, 2002), consider
scalar implicatures to be explicatures rather than any kind
of conversational implicatures. They result from a process of
pragmatic enrichment of the linguistic interpretation of the
utterance (the so-called logical form), yielding a relevant truth-
conditional propositional form. This enrichment process is on
a par with what happens for most utterances (e.g., loose talk,
metaphors, etc). For instance, a sentence such as “This steak is
raw,” uttered in restaurant, is usually interpreted as This steak
is undercooked. This final interpretation is obtained through
a contextually driven process of ad hoc concept construction
(loosening or strengthening) applying locally to the concept raw1.
In such cases, the ad hoc concept construction is not, in any
sense, a lexically based process: it is a contextually driven non-
linguistic, conceptual process. The claim that scalar implicatures
are interpreted through an identical process of ad hoc concept
construction excludes both any Gricean-style mechanism based
on alternatives and any role for the lexical scales as proposed
by NG approaches. Additionally, ad hoc concept construction
is believed to be a cognitively costly process, which implies that
scalar implicatures will come at a price and will be accessed only
when the context makes them relevant (see Noveck and Sperber,
2007 for a discussion). Thus, the PG approach differs from NG
approaches in that it gives a central place to context and sees
scalar inferences as the result of a contextual process, not allowing
any role to lexical scales.
Previous experimental work on scalar inferences has
concentrated on the opposite predictions drawn from the two
accounts regarding processing cost. According to the NG account,
the pragmatic interpretation is less costly than the semantic
interpretation. On the PG accoun, the semantic interpretation
is less costly than the pragmatic interpretation. Cashing the
notion of cost in terms of cognitive difficulty, this suggests that
the most costly interpretation should come later in cognitive
development and that it should take more time to be processed.
Thus, NG predicts that the semantic interpretation should
come later and take more time, while PG predicts that it is the
pragmatic interpretation that should come later and take more
time. Studies that contrasted NG and PG accounts in terms of
processing cost have provided robust evidence in favor of the
PG account, because there is a clear progression of pragmatic
interpretations from the younger age to adults (Noveck, 2001;
see also Papafragou and Musolino, 2003; Papafragou and
Tantalou, 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Pouscoulous et al., 2007)
and reaction time (RT) measures in adults show that pragmatic
interpretations of scalar terms take longer to access than semantic
interpretations (Bott and Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2012 but see
for different results Feeney et al., 2004). Moreover, the proportion
of pragmatic answers observed with adults was strongly context-
dependent (see also Hartshorne et al., 2015 and Dupuy et al.,
2016, for more data on the strong context-sensitivity of pragmatic
interpretations for scalar implicatures). This context-dependency
contradicts Levinson’s default account, which implies that all
underinformative sentences with scalar terms should be given
1As is usual, small capitals are used here for concepts, not for words.
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pragmatic interpretations and that semantic interpretations
should only be given when the implicature is explicitly negated.
Thus, all the experimental results up to now strongly favor PG
accounts and starkly contradict the predictions of NG accounts.
There is nevertheless a crucial and interesting element in NG that
has not been empirically investigated: the psychological reality of
lexical scales.
Current State of the Debate
While the simple lexical default account proposed by Levinson
(2000) has been definitely contradicted by the experimental
evidence, a new and more sophisticated NG account has recently
been proposed by Chierchia (2013) and has not yet been tested.
Chierchia proposes a far-ranging theory, encompassing not only
scalars, but free-choice implicatures, polarity items, as well
as upward and downward entailing linguistic environments.
Regarding scalar implicatures, Cherchia argues that they result
from a covert exhaustification operator (roughly equivalent in
meaning to only) that operates on a set of alternatives determined
by the scale the scalar term belongs to. However, this set of
alternatives is only available to the exhaustification process if
the context makes it mandatory to derive the implicature. For
instance, if, in answer to the question “Did the pianist play all
Mozart sonatas?”, the speaker hearer answers “He played some
Mozart sonatas,” the alternative set including most and all will
be available, while if the question had been “Did the pianist play
Mozart sonatas?”, it would not be. Chierchia (2013, p. 104) notes
that relevance to conversational goals is the central contextual
factor in the derivation of scalar inferences.
On this new version of NG, quite a few of the differences
with PG disappear: Chierchia does not commit himself about
the cost of the implicature. He acknowledges a major role of the
context, including what he calls “conversational relevance,” which
determines whether or not the scalar inference will be drawn.
However, in Chierchia’s theory, the alternatives are entirely due
to Horn scales (e.g., <all, many, some>, which are lexically
determined). It is the psychological reality of such scales that we
are interested in testing in the present study.
There is no question that words inside a scale usually form a
‘family’ in the sense that they have related meanings (e.g., <all,
many, some>) are all quantifiers. On this, both NG and PG
would agree, but there is more to a scale than words with related
meanings. In the NG account, the stronger words in a scale (i.e,
“all”) are necessary for the interpretation of the weaker words
(i.e., “some”) whenever an implicature is derived (they yield the
alternative set: e.g., ‘some and maybe all’), while the stronger
words can be interpreted without recourse to the weaker words
in all circumstances (e.g., ‘all’ is always all, not less). These two
characteristics of scales —that words inside a scale are related,
and that there is an interpretive asymmetry due to the fact that
stronger words are necessary to the interpretation of the weaker
words, but the reverse is not true— open a road for behavioral
investigations, using a masked priming paradigm (Forster and
Davis, 1984).
As scales are supposed to be recovered automatically from the
lexicon in NG (the context makes them available or not to the
exhaustification mechanism), the simple and automatic nature
of masked priming in a lexical decision task seems particularly
appropriate to test the question of the psychological reality of
Horn scales. Given that one form of priming is semantic in
nature (i.e., words belonging to the same semantic fields prime
one another more strongly than they prime words from other
semantic fields (Perea and Rosa, 2002), we expect that words
belonging to the same scale should prime one another. Crucially,
as scales are ordered sets of words and given the NG notion that
the stronger words are used in the interpretation of the weaker
words, while the stronger words can be interpreted regardless
of the weaker words, there should be an asymmetry in priming:
weaker words in a scale should prime stronger words in the same
scale more than stronger words would prime weaker words. For
instance, in the scale <all, many, some>, some should prime
many and all more than many would prime some and more than
all would prime many and some.
By contrast, given that PG does not give lexical scales any role
in the construction of the ad hoc concepts that it sees as the core
of scalars, at most it would predict that, as any set of semantically
related words, words inside a scale would prime one another
more strongly than they would prime other words. However,
it would not predict any asymmetry in the strength of priming
between weaker and stronger words.
EXPERIMENT: LEXICAL DECISION TASK
WITH MASKED PRIMING
In order to test the asymmetry prediction, a lexical decision
task with masked priming was conducted. The masked priming
paradigm (e.g., Forster and Davis, 1984) consists in presenting
a subliminal prime to facilitate the processing of a target word.
Note that priming is the phenomenon by which the presentation
of a first item (the prime) will influence the processing of
a second item (the target). In masked priming, the prime is
presented subliminally, that is, too quickly for the participant
to be aware that it was presented. These priming paradigms
with a simple lexical decision task (where participants have to
decide whether the target is a word or a non-word, after they
have been presented with another word subliminally) give us
a good opportunity to test the psychological reality of scales.
Hence, this is a simple experimental paradigm that does not
depend on any kind of reasoning and that is largely automatic
given that the prime is not consciously perceived (Dehaene et al.,
1998).
In particular, participants were presented with a subliminal
prime word followed by the target and asked to judge whether
the target was a word or a non-word. The measure was the
RT between the presentation of the target and the participant’s
answer. The task included two experimental conditions: in one
condition, the prime was a weaker term than the target on the
informativity scale (Implicature condition: e.g., SOME — all); in
the other condition the prime was a stronger member than the
target (Implication condition: e.g., ALL — some). Additionally,
two control conditions were designed: one in which the prime
and the target were identical (Identical condition: e.g., SOME —
some); and one in which the prime was a sequence of consonants
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of the same length (in terms of number of letters) as the target
(Consonant condition: e.g., ZSQW— some).
The identical condition should yield the shortest average RT
because a term maximally primes itself. The consonant condition
should have the longest RT response, because there cannot be any
priming effect at all in this condition. Thus, these two control
conditions should allow us to verify that the experiment worked
well and to have a control on whether or not the RT of the
participants is the result of the simple processing and reading
of the target stimuli. Regarding the experimental conditions,
the NG account (which supposes the psychological reality of
scales) predicts that the target should be evaluated faster in the
implicature condition (e.g., SOME – all) than in the implication
condition (e.g., ALL – some).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were 48 French native speakers, graduate students
from the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Lyon, aged 20–30, right-
handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision (20 males,
mean age 22.4; 28 females, mean age 21.4). They participated on a
voluntary basis, with no financial compensation. Five additional
participants were tested but their data were not included in our
analysis because they were ambidextrous (3), or because they
made more than 30 errors (10%) during the test (2).
Design and Stimuli
The experimental material was built on the basis of 129 items: 43
scalar terms, 43 pseudo-words and 43 sequences of consonants.
We tested 18 scales: 11 included two words (e.g.,<and, or>) and
7 three words (e.g., <some, most, all>) (c.f., Data Sheet 1 for a
complete list of scales). Middle words from the three-word scales
were used for both the implication and implicature conditions.
The scales we tested were chosen among those mentioned in the
NG literature (e.g., Levinson, 2000; Horn, 2004). Given that our
purpose was to test the general hypothesis that priming effect
would be stronger in the implicature than in the implication
condition, we took scales from various syntactic categories,
connectives, quantifiers, adverbs, verbs, and adjectives, and scales
composed of two or three words, without assuming any particular
difference between them. This choice was motivated by the fact
that we did not have any specific hypothesis on whether these
different categories would trigger stronger or weaker effects of
priming or on whether the number of lexical items in the scale
(two or three) would modulate the priming effect. French words
belonging to scales were used and were controlled for length
and frequency of word, letters, bigram and trigram with the
LEXIQUE database (New et al., 2004). The pseudo-words were
created with an application from the Lexique Toolbox, which
is a generator of pseudo-words from the same database. The
pseudo-words were controlled for length and bigram frequency.
Crucially, note that the frequency of the target words used
had a similar range between the two experimental conditions
(implication condition: mean = 1.81, median = 1.88, SD = 1.10,
range: from −0.47 to 4.13; implicature condition: mean = 2.18;
median= 1.98, SD= 1.24, range: from 0.49 to 4.32).
Each target word in the scales was either primed with itself, its
matching consonant or the other word(s) in the scale, resulting
in 150 prime-target stimuli (11∗2∗3 + 7∗3∗4) and 150 matching
pseudo-words conditions for a total of 300 trials. Thus, each
word was seen by each subject, as a prime and as a target in the
identical condition, as a prime or as target in the implicature and
implication conditions, as a prime for the pseudo-word condition
and as a target in the consonant condition (where the sequence of
consonants was used as a prime). For a better understanding of
the way that the words were assigned to the different conditions
presented to participants, Data Sheet 1 provides a table of stimuli
showing for each target word, the words presented as a prime in
each condition.
The entire list of stimuli were presented in a fully within-
subjects design, such that all subjects saw exactly the same stimuli
in each condition in a different randomized order, for each
subject.
Procedure
The experiment was implemented with Neurobehavioural
Systems, Inc. Presentation R© 14.9 program. The experiment took
place on an individual basis in a quiet experimental room. Each
trial started with a fixation point presented in the center of the
screen for 500 ms. Then a forward mask (######) was presented
for 34 ms and was immediately followed by a uppercase prime
presented for 34 ms. The prime was replaced by another mask
(######) for 34 ms before the target appeared on the screen.
Participants were instructed to press one of two pre-defined
buttons on the keyboard (the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ key buttons)
to indicate whether the lower case letter string was a French word
or not. For half of the participants the ‘right’ key corresponded to
the ‘yes’ response and for the other half to the ‘no’ response. The
target remained on the screen until participant’s response (see
Figure 1). The lexical decision had to be performed as rapidly
and as accurately as possible. The dependent variables were the
RTs and error rates. When the participant responded, the target
disappeared from the screen. The inter-trial interval was 1500 ms.
Participants were not informed of the presence of the prime and
in a debriefing after the experiment, none of them have reported
detecting the prime words during the experiment.
Data Analyses
Statistical data analysis and graphics were produced with R
software version 3.2.2 (R Core Team, 2015) with packages
multcomp (Hothorn et al., 2008) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2015).
The response time analysis included only correct answers (per
subject average 97.83%, median = 98.00%; range: from 93.00
to 99.67%). RTs below 300 ms and above 2000 ms were
automatically excluded from the analysis because we assume that
responses longer than 2000 ms reflect distraction rather than
lexical decision and responses below 300 ms reflect anticipatory
responses prior to proper stimulus processing. For the remaining
trials, RTs outside of the interval defined by the intra-subject
average ±2.5 standard deviation were discarded to minimize the
impact of outliers on mean RT. Using these procedures, 5.58%
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FIGURE 1 | Time course for a single trial. Each trial started with a fixation
point in the middle of the screen presented during 500 ms. Then a mask, a
prime and a mask appeared for 34 ms each, immediately followed by the
target word that appeared in the screen until the participant answered if it was
a word or a pseudo-word. Note that for each trial, the mask contained exactly
the same numbers of characters of the word used as prime.
of the initial data were discarded from the final analysis. RTs
were then averaged for each participant in each of the different
conditions prior to the calculation of the grand average over all
participants.
RESULTS
Figure 2 shows the averaged RTs for each condition and the
standard error across all participants. Average RTs for the target
words presented in the identical condition were faster than
average RTs for the same targets in the consonant condition.
Average RTs for the two experimental conditions were in-between
these two control conditions with higher averaged RTs in the
implication condition than in the implicature condition.
Note, however, that the target words in the implicature
condition (e.g., SOME — all) and implication conditions (e.g.,
ALL — some) are not the same. Potential differences in RTs
between these two conditions could therefore be related to
differences in the default reading time of the target words
themselves. We therefore used a linear mixed effect model to
analyze our data, with condition as a fixed effect and target
word and participants as random effects. Confidence intervals
for Tukey contrasts estimated with this model and a 95%
family wise confidence level are shown in Figure 3. Tests that
these contrasts are null based on the model are reported in
Table 1.
Figure 3 and Table 1 indicate an estimated 10.12 ms reduction
of response time in the implicature condition compared with
the implication condition. Confidence intervals based on a 95%
family wise confidence level slightly overlaps with zero and the
single-step p-value adjustment indicates that this effect is not
significant (p = 0.16). Note, however, that we are only interested
in the single contrast between Implication and Implicature
conditions. Correction for multiple testing is therefore not
required. The uncorrected p-value is significant (p = 0.04).
The data can thus be interpreted in favor of the existence of
scales.
Following reviewers’ suggestions, we also looked at the data
scale by scale. As our data does not allow us to conduct statistical
analysis (since for each subject we had only one data point of
RT for each scale in each condition), this analysis is presented
as “Presentation 1” to which the interested reader is directed.
DISCUSSION
As reviewed in our introduction, all the experimental literature
has favored PG over NG accounts of how scalar implicatures are
derived. However, one issue that has not been experimentally
investigated so far is the psychological reality of lexical scales,
a central issue for NG. Additionally, given recent developments
in NG accounts (see Chierchia, 2013), the existence of scales has
become the main point of departure between NG and PG, or at
least one that is open to behavioral measures.
Using a masked priming paradigm, we tested the differential
predictions of the two accounts. Predictions, based on the NG
account, were that RTs in the implicature condition would be
faster than in the implication condition because weaker words
of a scale should prime stronger words of the same scale more
than stronger words prime weaker words. By contrast, following
the PG account, one would expect words inside a scale to prime
one another (due to their syntactic and semantic proximity), but
no such asymmetry of priming would be predicted, as scales are
not supposed to play any role in the derivation of pragmatic
interpretations for scalar implicatures.
The experiment described in this paper shows that an
asymmetric relation holds between the members of lexical scales
implicated in scalar implicature computations: weaker terms of
a scale (e.g., “seldom”) primed stronger terms (e.g., “never”)
more than the reverse. In a word decision task with masked
priming, where participants were asked to judge whether the
target presented in a screen was or was not a word in French,
they were faster to judge that the stronger term of a scale was a
word when it was subliminally preceded by the weaker term of
the scale (e.g., “SELDOM – never”), than to judge that the weaker
term of the scale was a word when it was subliminally preceded
by the stronger term (e.g., “NEVER – seldom”). This asymmetry
suggests, for the first time in the literature, that lexical scales are a
psychological reality.
These results do also allow us to distinguish between the
different predictions of the two main accounts of the role
of lexical scales in the generation of pragmatic interpretation
for scalar implicatures. They clearly favor the involvement of
scales in the derivation of the pragmatic interpretation for
scalar implicatures, in keeping with NG predictions and in
contradiction with PG predictions.
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FIGURE 2 | Grand Average of Reaction Time (RT; ms) obtained for each condition. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean across 48 subjects.
FIGURE 3 | Confidence intervals obtained with a 95% family wise estimate for Tukey contrasts on condition with our linear mixed effect model.
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TABLE 1 | Simultaneous tests for general linear hypotheses estimated with a linear mixed effect model with condition as a fixed effect and subject and
target word as random effects.
Estimate Standard error z-value Pr( >|t|) single step Pr(>|t|) Uncorrected
Implicature – Identical = = 0 10.386 4.071 2.551 0.05154 0.01074
Implication – Identical = = 0 20.506 4.062 5.048 <0.001 <0.001
Consonant – Identical = = 0 33.606 3.542 9.489 <0.001 <0.001
Implication – Implicature = = 0 10.119 4.861 2.082 0.15689 0.03738
Consonant – Implicature = = 0 23.220 4.081 5.689 <0.001 <0.001
Consonant – Implication = = 0 13.100 4.070 3.219 0.00703 0.00258
The p-values reported in Pr(>|t|) columns are adjusted either with a single-step method or no correction.
Our results do not address, however, two further questions.
The first one concerns the diversity of the scales we tested. As
it can be seen in Data Sheet 1, we have tested a somewhat
heterogeneous set of lexical scales and it is possible that some
scales would induce pragmatic interpretations at a much higher
rate than others would. As suggested by the reviewers of
this paper, the effect generated by lexical scales with logical
connectives (e.g., <and, or>), quantifiers (e.g., <all, many,
some>) and modals (<allowed, obligatory>) could be stronger
than other scales such as <bright, intelligent>. Supporting
this hypothesis, Van Tiel et al. (2016) have argued, based on
experimental investigations, that some scales (notably <all,
many, some> and <and, or>) induce a much higher rate
of pragmatic interpretations for scalar implicatures than do
others (e.g., <small, tiny>). Although we have checked our
results by scale and observed that our significant priming effect
from Implication minus Implicature conditions is observed
for the majority of the scales we tested, independently of the
type of lexical scale or the number of items it contains (see
“Presentation 1” for an exploratory analysis by scale), we did
not conduct statistical analyses using “scale” as a factor, because
for each subject we had only one data point per scale in each
condition. So this analysis would be meaningless. Consequently,
our data does not allow us to propose an interpretation of the
effects derived by each scale individually. However, it might
be considered that since the overall pattern of results can be
observed for the majority of the scales we tested; despite of their
heterogeneity, the asymmetry in RT between the implication
and the implicature conditions seems to be robust enough.
Further investigations using the same methodology exploited
in this paper (masked priming) could, however, be done to
address the question of the differences in the magnitude of
the effect across scales. For instance, it would be important to
investigate more precisely whether the variability between scales
that has been evidenced in recent work using other experimental
methods (see Van Tiel et al., 2016) and seems to be present
in our data (see “Presentation 1”), could be replicated in other
studies with specific predictions about how and why some
lexical scales can behave differently in they way they induce
pragmatic interpretations. Nevertheless, our results are entirely
compatible with the idea that scales may differ in how strongly
they mandate pragmatic interpretations, or in the degree of
automaticity with which they are accessed in the interpretation
of scalar implicatures.
The second question that our results do not address concerns
the possibility for participants to consider alternatives beyond
the lexical items that appear in Horn scales, as it was recently
suggested in a computational model of pragmatic inferences
developed by Peloquin and Frank (2016). Their model tried
to account for the fact that people consider the use of “some”
inappropriate when the speaker could have used “one” or
“two” and for the fact that when asked to produce alternative
words to replace a word in a sentence (e.g., “some” in “Some
students came”), people come up with lexical items beyond
the relevant Horn scale (e.g., not only “many” or “all,” but
also “few” and “none”). This led to the proposition that the
alternative set for “some” should include “none,” “few,” “most,”
“all”. We think that this does not pose a major problem for
Horn scales: the first phenomenon does not lead to a pragmatic
interpretation but merely to an infelicity judgment, which does
not necessarily entail a pragmatic interpretation to “not all”;
the second phenomenon does not seem to have anything to do
with the derivation of a pragmatic interpretation. So we take it
that the present results should be interpreted, quite simply, as a
way of adjudicating between the two main approaches to scalar
implicatures.
This is thus one of the first empirical results clearly consistent
with the new version of NG account as recently proposed by
Chierchia (2013). It should not, however, be taken to verify it
in its entirety. The process through which scalar implicatures
are derived in that account is complex. Additionally, the
whole account is wide ranging and cannot be reduced to the
interpretation of scalars. However, we provide an important first
step in the empirical investigation of that account and bring a
new type of data examining to what extent different words on
lexical scales prime one another, which allowed us to distinguish
accounts of scalar implicature generation.
Note, however, that the present results are obtained from
words presented in isolation, while pragmatic interpretations
are obtained for scalar terms occurring in sentences, usually
in context. Our results do not have much to say about the
process itself (notably they shed no light on whether as claimed
by Chierchia (2013), it is an exhaustification process using a
silent operator on sets of alternatives). However, they strongly
suggest, given the asymmetry in RTs between the implication
and implicature conditions, that scales must play a role in
the interpretation process of scalar implicatures. Otherwise, the
asymmetry would not have been observed. It is, indeed, hard
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if not impossible to explain this asymmetry based on the PG
account. Finally, it should be noted that the involvement of scales
in the interpretation process of scalar implicatures, which is the
conclusion mandated by our experimental results, is compatible
not only with Chierchia’s (2013) syntactic NG approach, but also
with pragmatic Gricean approaches (Geurts, 2009; Geurts and
Pouscoulous, 2009; Geurts and Van Tiel, 2013).
In summary, this study reported the first experimental
evidence leading a distinction between the two main accounts
for the derivation of pragmatic interpretations for scalar
implicatures: NG versus PG. While PGs refuse any role for lexical
scales in the derivation of scalar inferences and offer a context-
based inferential account for scalar implicatures, NG accounts
claim that lexical scales are the core mechanism behind the
computation of scalar implicatures, and predict an asymmetry in
priming between the implicature and the implication conditions.
Supporting this hypothesis, the results that we obtained in a
lexical decision task using lexical scales in a masked priming
paradigm showed that weaker terms in a scale primed stronger
terms more than the reverse. This asymmetry provides then the
first experimental evidence in favor of the psychological existence
of scales and therefore supports the claim of NG accounts for the
role of lexical scales in the computation of scalar implicatures.
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